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that court to have overruled the doctrine as laid down in the Gage and
Wloczewski cases. However, there is no doubt that the Gould case did
clarify and settle the law that equity does not require mutuality of remedy
to exist at the inception of a contract, but that such mutuality may also
occur by the commission of subsequent acts.

FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT-MUNICIPALITY NOT ALLOWED TO USE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AS DEFENSE
AGAINST FEDERAL GOVERNMENT COUNTERCLAIM
On April 13, 1958, a City of Newark ambulance collided with a United
States mail truck. The city brought an action against the United States in
the District Court under the Federal Tort Claims Act in the amount of
$3,000.1 The United States asserted a counterclaim for damage to the mail
truck totaling $245.75. The court found the concurrent negligence of
both drivers to be the cause of the accident. Judgment on the counterclaim
was entered for the municipality on the grounds that the defendant was
prevented from raising a defense of contributory negligence by New
Jersey decisions as applied under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Recovery
was denied to the city because the negligent act of the ambulance operator
was an "active wrongdoing" and, as such, was imputable to the municipality under New Jersey case law. Upon appeal by the plaintiff, the United
States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, affirmed the decision, but held
that the United States was not precluded from asserting a defense of contributory negligence. City of Newark v. United States, 254 F. 2d 93
(C.A. 3d, 1958).
This case raises the unusual point of whether the Federal Tort Claims
Act should be read literally, when such an interpretation results not only
in waiver of the sovereign immunity of the United States, but also in the
enhancement of the position of the municipal corporation by depriving
the federal government of a defense which it had prior to the passage of
the Act.
The immunity of the United States to actions commenced without its
express consent is traceable to the English political concept that the King
can do no wrong. While this political concept was repudiated in this
country, the legal doctrine, that the Crown was nevertheless immune from
suits to which it did not consent, has been consistently and vigorously
applied to the federal government. 2 Prior to the Federal Tort Claims Act,
relief against the federal government for legal wrongs committed by its
160 Stat. 846 (1946), 28 U.S.C. S 1346 (b) (c) (1948).
2 U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2, cl.1; Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950); Kansas v.

United States, 204 U.S. 331 (1907); United States v. McLemore, 45 U.S. 286 (1846).
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officers and employees was sought and sometimes granted by the passage
of private bills by Congress. Owing to the increasing number of these bills
and the public demand for remedy, the Act was passed in 1946. Thus,
sovereign immunity of the United States was waived and it was rendered
liable for torts under the same circumstances which would make an individual liable to a claimant in accordance with the law of the state in which
3
the tort occurred.
The law of New Jersey on the immunity of the municipal corporation
is well settled. The courts of that state have attributed to the municipality
not only immunity to suit but have gone so far as to confer immunity to a
defense of contributory negligence when the city institutes action against
an individual or private corporation. In City of Patersonv. Erie R. Co., 4 a

city fire truck collided with defendant's train at a highway railroad crossing. The cause of the accident was found to be the concurrent negligence
of both vehicle operators. The city received an involuntary nonsuit and
upon appeal, the Court of Errors and Appeals ruled that the negligence of
the city fire truck driver was not imputable to the municipality and, therefore, no contributory negligence could exist on the part of the city. This
doctrine is also extended to counties.5
It is noteworthy that only two other states have followed the rule of
Patersonv. Erie R. Co.6 And further, the New Jersey courts have made an
328 U.S.C. S 1346 (b) provides: "Subject to the provisions of chapter 171 of this tide,
the district courts .... shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against
the United States, for money damages, accruing on or after January 1, 1945, for injury
or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligence or wrongful
act or omission of any employee of the government while acting within the scope of his
office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person,
would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act
or omission occurred." 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (c) provides: "The jurisdiction conferred by
this section includes jurisdiction of any set-off, counterclaim, or other claim or demand
whatever on the part of the United States against any plaintiff commencing an action
under this section."
28 U.S.C. § 2674 provides: "The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions
of this tide relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private
individual under like circumstances, but shall not be liable for interest prior to judgment
or for punitive damages."
478 N.J.L. 592, 75 Ad. 922 (1910). Cf. Miller v. Layton, 133 N.J.L. 323, 44 A. 2d 177
(1945).
5 Miller v. Layton, 133 N.J.L. 323, 44 A. 2d 177 (1945).
6 Georgia and Wisconsin; City of Milwaukee v. Meyer, 204 Wis. 350, 235 N.W. 768
(1931) wherein the negligence of the municipal harbormaster, in securing a scow in a
manner prohibited by city ordinance, was not allowed to be imputed to the city when
it sued defendant for damage to a city bridge caused by the defendant's concurrent
negligence although the accident was found to be caused by the combined negligence;
Columbus R. Co. v. City of Columbus, 29 Ga. 8, 113 S.E. 243 (1922), where the city was
allowed to recover even though concurrent negligence on part of both city fire truck
driver and defendant's railroad car operator was found.
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exception to the immunity of municipalities in cases where the negligence
7
of the city is classified as an "active wrongdoing" as in the instant case.
An "active wrongdoing" is a negligent act of commission or positive mis8
feasance and is an exception to the doctrine of municipal immunity.
The proposition that a municipal corporation has sovereign immunity
in respect to "governmental" or "public" functions as opposed to "proprietary" or "private" functions is not founded on either the Constitution or
English Common Law. 9 This distinction and the doctrine of municipal
immunity as to "governmental" functions appears to have its genesis in
Bailey v. New York in 1842.10 While many of the states follow this view,
the federal courts do not. In Hopkins v. Clemson College, the United
States Supreme Court stated:
But neither public corporations nor political subdivisions are clothed with
that immunity from suit which belongs to the state alone by virtue of its sovereignty .... Undoubtedly counties, cities, townships and similar bodies politic often have a defense which relieves them from responsibility where a private corporation would be liable. But they must at least make that defense.
They cannot rely on freedom from accountability as could a State. 1
The states of the Union were first vested with sovereign immunity
from suits by individuals without the consent of the state in 1798 by the
Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. 12 However, the
states are not immune to actions by the United States because consent to
be so sued has been found to be implied in the Federal Plan. 13 When a state
submits its rights for determination in the federal courts, either by bringing the action or by voluntary consent of a defendant, it cannot escape
adjudication by later invoking the prohibitions of the Eleventh Amend14
ment.
In the instant case, the court admitted that the literal application of the
7 Bentivenga v. City of Plainfield, 128 N.J.L. 418, 26 A. 2d 288 (1942); Vickers v. City
of Camden, 122 N.J.L. 14, 3 A. 2d 613 (1939); Callan v. City of Passaic, 104 N.J.L. 643,
141 Ad. 778 (1928); Hart v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Union County, 57 N.J.L.

90, 29 At. 490 (Sup. Ct., 1894).
8 Ibid.
9 Barnett, The Foundation of the Distinction Between Public and Private Functions
in Respect to the Common-Law Tort Liability of Municipal Corporations, 16 Ore. L.
Rev. 250 (1937).
10 3 Hill (N.Y.) 531, 38 Am. Rep. 669 (1842).
11221 U.S. 636,645 (1911).
12

U.S. Const. Amend. 11.

13 United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950); United States v. Texas, 339 U.S.
707 (1950); Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934); United States v.
Texas, 143 U.S. 621 (1892).
14 Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18 (1933); Gunter v. Atlantic Coast R.R., 200 U.S. 273
(1906); Clark v.Barnard, 108 U.S. 436 (1883).
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wording of the Federal Tort Claims Act would have resulted in preclusion
of the defense of contributory negligence. The court, however, felt that a
situation where a municipal corporation would take advantage of the Act
to sue the United States and then raise a shield of municipal immunity
could not have been within the contemplation of Congress when the Act
was passed.
In doing so, it followed the general philosophy of construing the
statute as set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Feres v. United
States:
This Act, however, should be construed to fit, so far as will comport with
its words, into the entire statutory system of remedies15 against the Government
to make a workable, consistent and equitable whole.
15 340 U.S. 135, 139 (1950).

LABOR LAW-REFUSAL TO HANDLE GOODS UNDER
"HOT CARGO" CLAUSE HELD NO DEFENSE TO
CHARGE OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
The Sand Door Company sold doors to a millwork contractor who delivered them to the site of a hospital construction project in Southern
California. The general contractor was a party to a master labor agreement, which included its carpenters, and which stated, "workmen shall not
be required to handle non-union materials." The carpenters were installing
the doors when the business agent of Local 1976, International Brotherhood of Carpenters, notified the foreman that the doors were non-union
and could not be hung. The foreman thereupon ordered his men to cease
work. Subsequent negotiations failed to produce an agreement that would
allow the doors to be installed. The Sand Door Company petitioned the
NLRB 1 which ruled that the action of the business agent was a violation
of Section 8 (b) (4) (a) of the Taft-Hartley Act.2 This section provides,
in substance, that it is an unfair labor practice to induce employees of a
secondary employer to cease handling goods of a primary employer in
1 Local 1976, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America and Sand
Door and Plywood Co., 113 NLRB 1210 (1955).
2 National Labor Relations Act, Section 8(b) (4) (a) as amended by Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 29 U.S.C.A. S 158 (b) (4) (a) (1956).
Section 8 (b) provides that, "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents... (4) to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any
employer to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment
to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods,
articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services, where an object thereof
is: (a) forcing or requiring . . . any employer or other person to cease using, selling,
handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer,
processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person ......

